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The views expressed in this work are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Department of Politics and Public Administration 
 
Introduction 
Due to rising levels of political, economic and cultural heterogeneity, and the 
prospect of a multi-speed integration process, the debate about European identity 
construction could have been expected to disappear from the academic and political 
agenda. And not a few political scientists have argued that the enlarged European 
Union (EU) with its now 27 members will fail to lay the basis for a ‘pan-European 
identity’ (Billig, 1995; Niethammer, 2000b; Dobson and Weale, 2003). However, it 
seems that the attractiveness of this socio-political concept per se has not suffered 
from these realist, intergovernmentalist and state-centric accounts (Buonanno and 
Deakin, 2004). When looking at how the notion of European identity has influenced 
the current discussion about a European constitution, it will, on the contrary, 
appear that the issue has retained its salience.1  
 
                                               
1 See the Conference on European identity in Salzburg (‘Sound of Europe’, 27-28 January 
2006), attended by the Heads of States or governments of France, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Finland and Latvia. Also present were Germany’s foreign minister, the EU Commission 
President, the President of the European Parliament and a number of high profile academics 
and artists. 
Abstract 
This article scrutinises the application of collective political identity 
construction as a political concept to the process of European 
integration. As a starting point for my approach I take the recurring 
demands for a European identity which reflects a strong link between 
democratic legitimacy and the EU. Given the sui generis nature of the 
European integration process, I argue that these perceptions derive 
from the nation-building processes of the 18th and 19th centuries 
rather than reflecting the experience of an incremental political 
integration process. Contrary to the generalised assumption that 
identity construction is a prerequisite for political integration in Europe 
or the ‘missing link’, my argument is that European identity should 
rather be treated as a possible end product. Applying a strong path-
dependence model to European integration risks stepping into an 
‘identity trap’, which constrains indispensable systemic flexibility. 
Keywords: European identity, EU identity politics, path-dependency 
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Most contributions to European identity explored the concept’s historico-political 
and/or socio-psychological roots (Ahrweiler, 1993; Hale, 1993; Axford et al., 2000; 
Burke, 2000; Orluc, 2000). In recent years, more empirically oriented case studies 
have been conducted, providing different perspectives from national and regional 
levels (Boym, 2000; Gerber, 2000; Marcussen and Roscher, 2000; Strath, 2000). 
Finally, the concept found its way into the integration theoretical discourse. 
Primarily concerned with the end-product of European integration, scholars 
searched for desirable forms of political collective identity on supranational level 
(Mayer and Palmowski, 2004). Whereas ethnically based identity models were soon 
collectively dismissed (Kostakopoulou, 2001), the debate revolved around 
normative-ontological forms, such as constitutional patriotism (Habermas, 1992), 
postmaterialist citizenship (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995), multi-identitism 
(Kritzinger, 1999), utilitarian and civic identity (Lord, 1998), post-nationalism and 
supranationalism (Lacroix, 2004), or cosmopolitan-communitarianism (Bellamy and 
Castiglione, 2004).  
 
Many of these accounts of European identity formation and construction, however, 
overlook the complexity of collectivisation processes, their conditions and 
constrains (see Niethammer, 2000a; Eder, 2002). Apparently missing in the 
discussion is a more process-oriented account of the practical feasibility and 
necessity of EU identity politics. In this context, the fundamental question, of 
whether European collective identity should be regarded as a missing link to a 
successful, stable and democratic European Union is examined.  
 
Assessing collective identity formation processes necessarily raises significant 
conceptual and methodological problems (Smith, 1992; Breakwell and Lyons, 1996; 
Cinnirella, 1996; Strath, 2002). Hence to avoid the theoretical traps of 
operationalization and definition, the focus of my analysis will therefore avoid 
questions of historical existence, form or desirability of European identity. 
Applying a modernist-constructivist approach on identity building2, I rather seek to 
explore the conditions of collective identity construction and the utility of European 
identity as a political instrument. The inspiration for this study came from 
Kostakopoulou’s claim, that ‘most academics tend to view European identity as the 
“mirror image” of national identity and apply concepts, models and practices 
associated with the nation-state and/or federal systems to the EC/EU” 
                                               
2 Following Buonanno and Deakin’s (2004) categorization of identity formation processes, 
which differentiates four explanatory theories: 1. Primordialist/essentialist (Smith, 1992; 
Gellner, 1983; Nanz, 2000); 2. Postmodernists (Ruggie, 1993); 3. Post-nationalist (Habermas, 
1974, 1991, 1992; Delanty, 1995); 4. Modernist (Grew 1986; Anderson, 1983; and Hobsbawm, 
1990). It should be noted here that the constructivist approach treats identity formation as a 
process ‘from above’, i.e. through the mechanisms of policy making. Reverse processes have 
been discussed by Soysal (2002).  
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(Kostkopoulou, 2001: 14), which I found intriguing but not sufficiently developed. 
Consequently, I chose Rokkan’s model on nation-building which he based on 
Almond and Pye’s crisis theory (Pye, 1968) in order to scrutinise the European 
integration process on its political community-building capacities. In doing so my 
approach differs from existing comparisons between state-building processes and 
the European integration process (Caporaso, 1996; Marks, 1997) and in particular 
that of Van Kersbergen (2000), who also applied a Rokkanian model. 
 
The main argument of this paper is that the two main pre-requisites to allow 
European collective identity construction are not fulfilled: a) the willingness of the 
European peoples to belong to a supra-political entity and b) the possession of 
identity forming instruments by a central authority. Taking into account the 
constantly renewed construction of national identity in the member states, I claim 
that attempts by the European Union – especially the European Commission – to 
institute some kind of European identity politics lacks instrumental power, which 
explains the absence of measurable effects. In general, this argumentation is based 
on realist accounts of International Relations, and, more specifically, with regards to 
regional integration, on intergovernmentalist and liberal-intergovernmentalist 
theory.3 
 
The paper further attempts to assess the same issue form a more normative-
theoretical perspective, i.e. the question of whether EU identity politics are in fact 
necessary to create a more legitimate basis for political integration. Here, I 
demonstrate that the idea of deriving legitimacy from collectivization originates in 
the historical nation-building processes in Western Europe prior to the 20th century. 
I claim that perceiving identity formation as a key condition of European 
integration risks applying a path-dependency model that does not allow for 
indispensable systemic flexibility. The model of nation-building proves to be 
inadequate as a blueprint for the supra-national building of the European Union 
and that identity formation should be regarded as a possible end-product rather 
than a prerequisite for a successful integration process. 
 
European identity as political instrument and political vision 
It is important to note that the introduction of European identity as a collective 
political basis for the European integration process happened for certain reasons 
and at a certain time. The launch of the Single Market project and the extension of 
the economic community towards a political union not only challenged the 
                                               
3 I refer to the works of Hoffmann (1966), Moravcsik (1998) and Milward (2000).  
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institutional, organisational and administrative structures of the integration 
process, it also raised fundamental questions of democratisation and legitimisation. 
It is therefore not surprising that from the late 1980s onwards, European identity 
became an increasingly popular notion within political and academic discourse 
(Smith, 1992; Habermas, 1992, 1998a; Delanty, 1995; Howe, 1995; Kostakopoulou, 
2001).4 It not only influenced the philosophical discourse about the nature of the 
European integration process, but increasingly found its way into official and semi-
official documents of the European Union (Kostakopoulou, 2001; Höjelid, 2001). 
Eventually, European identity became a standard demand of Europhile political 
rhetoric, a reference point for numerous declarations from local, regional, national, 
supranational and global agencies. 
 
What has made the concept of European identity so widespread, especially since it 
proves to be virtually un-definable? The various interpretations of the nature of 
European identity range from pre-modern historical-religious accounts to post-
national/supranational descriptions, from cultural over territorial frameworks to 
the different forms of political communitisation. It appears that it is exactly the lack 
of precision and common agreement that contributes to its usefulness and 
attractiveness. European identity proves to be a highly flexible political instrument 
(Walkenhorst, 1999), which can be assigned to different contexts, such as to be 
found in ‘Europe’s identity’, ‘European security identity’ and the ‘identity of the 
European Union on the international stage’.  
 
Understanding the phenomenology of European identity depends upon the 
ontological perspective of the observer. Speaking of Europe’s historical and cultural 
identity refers to a commonly perceived past with common values and common 
roots. In social terms, European identity is aimed at reflecting the political 
aspirations of the EU to increase the people’s attachment to the integration process 
in a long-term perspective and the need for cross-national solidarity. Here, 
European identity reflects the idea of a social framework which merges the political 
aim of an ‘ever closer union’ with that of a ‘people’s Europe’, responding to the 
notorious claim of a distanced, technocratic and elite-driven European project, 
which never created legitimacy ‘from below’.  
 
From a political viewpoint, a collective political identity usually shows a strong 
prospective connotation; something to be yet achieved. The reason for this is that 
European identity seemingly offers to perfectly fill the gap about the final goal of 
the EU, the so-called finalité politique. The concept proves to be particularly useful in 
that it does not refer to a more definite, static and therefore more controversial 
                                               
4 For a summary see White (2000). 
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political structure, such as a ‘superstate’ or ‘United States of Europe’. The British 
rejection of ‘federalism’ as the future shape of European integration, as articulated 
during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations (Johansson, 2002: 886), triggered the 
search for an alternative integration concept and a new long-term strategy. The 
pressures from the collapse of the communist system and the resulting power 
vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, in line with the ambition to build a political 
union, highlighted the need for an adapted political roadmap with a preferably 
declared official political-structural aim. Yet, the options available were limited to 
the classical dichotomy between ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’.  
 
As even newly established notions such as ‘Staatenverbund’ (German 
Constitutional Court, 1993) did not seem to have an appeal, the idea of a 
supranational identity-building process entered EU politics as a ‘soft goal’. 
Although never specified as such in primary EU legislation, politicians and experts 
alike believed they had found both an overarching goal and a device for securing 
the momentum of the integration process. Most importantly, however, it became 
prominent as the manifestation of a common vision, which, due to the openness of 
the process, is especially important. Another advantage of the identity concept is 
that it, once successfully created, could be expected to serve as a suitable, and even 
stronger, replacement for the fading permissive consensus which only provided a 
weak basis for public support. Greater support for, and participation in, the 
democratic process of integration (‘active citizenship’) would then considerably 
diminish both the democratic and the legitimacy deficits. In short, the successful 
creation of a collective European identity promises to serve as a potential solution 
for the political problems of European integration: the democratic accountability of 
the EU, the legitimacy deficit, the distance between decision-makers and demos and 
the lack of public support.  
 
The question of European identity refers to one of the fundamental controversies in 
the discourse on European Union: whether sustainable political integration is 
inevitably linked to, or even dependent on, social integration. As Laffan (1996: 96) 
observed: ‘[T]he need to create a “people’s Europe” and to strengthen the public’s 
identification with the European project has been a recurring theme in official 
thinking on European integration since the end of the 1960s.’ As one of the principal 
promoters of social integration, Karl Deutsch proposed his transactionalist 
approach, highlighting social communication as the key to successful integration 
(Deutsch, 1957). The European Commission’s ‘White Paper on Governance’ 
confirms the lasting salience of the social component of European politics: ‘Our 
overall goal draws on the simple principle that has guided European integration 
since the European Community was founded: to integrate the people of Europe, 
while fully respecting individual national identities’ (European Commission, 2001: 
32). Here, European identity is given the prominent status of not only a future 
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necessity but also a founding principle of the European integration process. With 
the White Paper, it appears that the normative concept of European identity has 
inevitably been formulated as a goal of EU policy making. 
 
All these accounts, however, neglect the methods, conditions and instruments 
necessary to create a politically motivated collective identity. Before discussing the 
questions of feasibility and necessity of European identity formation, the next 
section concentrates on the conditions and processes of politically constructed 
identities from the perspective of identity politics.  
 
Sources and conditions of identity politics 
Examining the political relevance of collective identity, the most obvious link 
derives from the study of nationalism. Nationalism, understood from a 
constructivist perspective, describes the homogenisation of regional groupings for 
the purpose of nation-building. In order to construct the image, idea and identity of 
the nation, governments pursue identity politics (Miller, 2000; Young, 1990). These 
embrace the promotion of state symbolism and mythology, accompanied by a set of 
policies on language, culture, media, youth and education. Even modern states rely 
on their monopoly on identity politics in order to create legitimacy and public 
support.5  
 
Nationalism and national identity creation are not isolated phenomena. Assessing 
their overwhelming success as instruments for social integration in 18th and 19th 
century Europe, a significant constellation of conditions becomes apparent. The 
constructivist school around Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm identified 
unparalleled and fundamental changes in the political and socio-economic 
environment, which preceded and eventually allowed for the construction of newly 
defined collective identities (Anderson, 1983; Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1983; 
Hobsbawm, 1990; Hutchinson and Smith, 1994; Kriesi et al., 1999; Rokkan, 1975; 
Wendt, 1999). Identity politics became the principal instrument of the state to 
promote social integration, which proved to be essential to secure the legitimacy of 
the state (Easton, 1965, 1975). 
 
In his seminal work about state and nation-building, Rokkan (1975) identified the 
political and societal elites as the most important actors in the construction of 
                                               
5 The modern democratic state of course has only limited control over the media, and also 
the direct influence on education varies from state to state. In multi-national and federal 
states, education (Germany) and also language matters (Belgium, Spain, Canada) are 
decentralised. 
CONSTRUCTING THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY: TRAP OR GAP? 
HEIKO WALKENHORST 
7 
 
collective identity. Before full mobilisation of the economy and the political masses 
took place, new linkages between national and local elites proved to be decisive for 
the consolidation of the governmental system; this gave enough time to build 
efficient organisations before the nation-building process was activated in terms of 
national identity, mass participation and redistribution of benefits and resources 
(Flora, 1999: 130). This ‘period of political, economic, and cultural unification at the 
elite level’ – state formation – (Rokkan, 1975: 571-2) was followed by what Gellner 
described as the ‘invention of a national identity’ (Gellner, 1983).  
 
However, this top-down process would not have been sustainable if it had not been 
supported by popular demand, or, at least, consent from below. The prospect of 
orientation, belonging and citizenship in the newly established state obviously met 
the majority of the people’s desire to belong to a culturally, historically and 
politically homogeneous frame of reference with its clear geographical borders and 
its centralised source of political authority. This mechanism works at the same time 
as a tool for exclusion, as it clearly distinguishes between in-group, out-group and 
enemies (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995; Habermas, 1998b), involving highly complex 
social processes of education, socialisation, recognition and social transactions 
(Taylor, 1994; Wendt, 1999; Tilly 2002). With the emergence of the welfare state, 
social policy became a crucial part of identity politics in post-war Western Europe, 
assuring political stability through popular support and social peace. Because social 
structures are rather fragile, changeable and contestable constructs (Christiansen et 
al., 1999), collective political identities need permanent governmental maintenance 
to balance out various centripetal or centrifugal forces within society (Miller, 2000).  
 
How does the study of nationalism relate to the question of European identity 
formation? Firstly, within the European integration process structures of 
supranational identity politics have become visible, such as in the areas of 
education, youth, media and social policies (Laffan, 1996). Even the Economic and 
Monetary Union and the euro have been described as a form of identity politics 
(Engelmann et al., 1997). Secondly, European identity has been repeatedly and 
officially linked to demands on increased legitimacy. Before assessing the viability 
of supranational identity politics, however, I explore if, and how far, state-building 
processes and the process of European integration carry similarities, and whether 
the nation-building model corresponds with the supranational integration process. 
 
Political identity construction: nation-state building and regional 
integration contrasted 
Despite dense geographical proximity, the development of the European state 
system created a wide range of variations. Several theorists have endeavoured to 
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condense the huge complexity of the European experience into a single model. The 
most prominent attempts have been produced and published during the 1960s and 
1970s in the USA (see Bendix, 1964; Deutsch, 1957; Pye, 1966; Rokkan, 1975 and 
Tilly, 1975). The shortcomings of these models notwithstanding, the emergence of 
the modern ‘bureaucratic-participant state’, as Rokkan et al. (1971: 9) called it, can 
be separated into different evolutionary stages. The status of collective identity-
construction in the course of state and nation-building (Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 
1973) is best visible in the following model introduced by Rokkan, which he based 
on the crisis theory developed by the almost legendary Committee of Comparative 
Politics led by Almond and Pye.  
 
The three main sequences of nation-building (state-building, nation-building and 
consolidation of system) suggest an order in which the end-result, the political entity, 
is achieved by, first formal, (penetration, integration) and then socio-political 
integration (identity, legitimacy, participation). For a democracy this means, that 
political structures precede the emergence of a demos, which in turn legitimises the 
system. The politicisation of identity within this process appears to be, as Vernon 
(1993) argues, almost inevitable: ‘[It] is arguably impossible to create politics 
capable of attracting popular support which does not seek to transcend differences 
both within and between decentred individual and collective actors with some kind 
of unifying identity’ (cited in: Tilly, 2002: 22). The overwhelming success of 
‘national identity’ as ‘the most fundamental and inclusive of collective identities’ 
(Smith, 1991: 143) cannot be neglected as it eventually allowed the nation state to 
become the prominent political unit in world politics. 
 
Yet so, the limitations and constraints of (politically motivated) identity-formation, 
are often overlooked. Although many attempts to create a national identity 
succeeded in the last centuries, it would be mistaken to assume an automatic effect 
of identity politics. When large proportions of the population reject the proposed 
foundations of national identity, the ‘stateness problem’ occurs (Linz and Stepan, 
1992). Lucian Pye (1968, 1971a) identified four basic crisis of national identity 
formation: territory, class, ethnic divisions, and social change. Examples from modern 
European history indicate where nation-building failed to create stable and 
legitimising identity patterns, both in democratic states (Weimar Republic) and 
authoritarian systems (GDR, USSR). And also parts of several modern and 
democratic societies suffer from a lack of national collectiveness, exemplified by 
violent secessionism (Northern Ireland, the Basque country, Corsica). It is therefore 
essential to note that identity politics do not guarantee a positive effect by default.  
They can be rejected by parts or even the majority of the population, causing in turn 
de-legitimising and de-stabilising effects. 
 
CONSTRUCTING THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY: TRAP OR GAP? 
HEIKO WALKENHORST 
9 
 
Table 1: Model of State- and Nation-building  
Stage 
 
Crisis, 
Challenge, 
Problem 
Institutional solution, examples 
 
 
State-building 
Penetration Establishment of a rational bureaucracy in order to 
mobilize resources (taxes, work force), to create public 
order and coordinate tasks (development of 
infrastructure, defence, crisis management) 
 Integration Establishment of rules in order to guarantee equal 
access to the public sector, values and resources for 
different cultural and political groupings 
 
 
 
 
Nation-
building 
 
Identity 
 
Establishment of media systems and institutions in order 
to socialize the citizens: schools, information and 
communication systems, institutionalized rites and 
symbols (myths, flags, anthems etc.) 
 
 Legitimacy Efforts to create loyalty and trust among the citizens in 
favour of respective political institutions; efforts to 
secure obedience to the law 
 
 
Consolidation 
of  
System 
Participation Extension of franchise for formerly unprivileged groups, 
protection of minority rights   
 
 Distribution Establishment of institutions in order to promote social 
security, income adjustment through progressive 
taxation and financial balancing between prosperous and 
poor regions 
Source: Rokkan (1979). This model was given preference to the more renowned model Rokkan 
published later in his career (see Rokkan, 1975) because of its separate identity-building section. The 
original and more sophisticated account of the crisis theory was presented by Pye in 1968 (Pye 1968).  
 
Reviewing nation-building processes illustrates that collective identity is not simply 
a result of implementing top-down identity politics (see Tilly, 2002). Most 
importantly, certain domestic conditions have to be met in order to achieve a 
situation where elites or societal majorities allow a government to replace older 
identity structures with new ones. These situations can occur in cases of a power 
vacuum, internal revolution, long term changes in the social composition of states, 
international conflict or war. From a historical perspective, it appears to be rather a 
combination of fundamental changes in the (internal and/or external) socio-
political environment that trigger changes in collective identity patterns. According 
to Howe (1995: 45), ‘it is no single factor alone that determines the readiness of a 
population to receive and digest new beliefs about the boundaries of community. 
What matters is the cumulative impact of a whole series of conditions’. 
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Difficulties and peculiarities of supranational community-building 
It is important to note that, from a constructivist perspective, it would be wrong to 
claim the impossibility of supranational identity construction; Switzerland, Canada 
and Belgium are prominent examples of successful multinational community-
building processes (Howe, 1995: 30). If certain prerequisites and conditions were 
fulfilled, even in a world of globalisation and growing economic interdependence 
the emergence of new post-national political identities is possible, at least thinkable. 
The aim of this and the next section is to scrutinise the extra- and intra-political 
conditions for collective community building in the European context. 
 
To begin with, the historical-geographical and socio-political characteristics of 
Europe as a continent have generated a ‘multiple identity area’ of overlapping 
territorial and historical spaces at local, regional and national territorial level. This 
constellation, however, translates into a ‘multiple identity problem’ when viewed 
from the supranational perspective. It has repeatedly been stressed that Europe as a 
continent does not provide for a geographical frame of reference that could 
translate into ‘politico-territorial rule’, an essential part of collective identity 
formation (Elias, 1969, cited in Bornschier, 2000: 8). Europeans have also not created 
an ethnos in the proto-national sense (Lord, 1998; Blavoukos and Sigalas, 2000). 
Garcia (1993: 2) concludes: ‘In contrast with the process of nation-building, elements 
such as a common language and education, free-flowing labour markets, and a 
civic-minded society, with full rights of citizenship, are not there.’  
 
Referring back to the importance of elite coalitions emphasised by Rokkan, the 
current status of the integration process shows a high level of consolidation. This is, 
however, only true with regard to the economic dimension of the European Union, 
which has received sufficient elite support and promotion. The single market 
programme and the single currency can be construed as the result of a Europe-wide 
consensus among political and economic elites (Dyson, 2002: 9), who have largely 
disregarded public opinion and popular support. On the political dimension, 
however, the lack of elite consensus is easily displayed by the continuing difficulties 
of system reform (especially the post-Maastricht process), the introduction of 
multiple forms of governance (flexibility, opt-outs, closer cooperation, open method 
of coordination), and overall disagreement about the finalité of the integration 
process. The third condition of identity formation, as noted above, is that of popular 
demand or public preparedness. People in Europe primarily relate to the already 
existing structures of nationally defined collectives. No major popular movement 
has yet emerged that demands supranationalism and that could initiate some kind 
of pro-supranationalist revolution. On the contrary, there appears to be a growing 
and intensifying group of people who seem to collectivise on the basis of being anti-
European, especially in Britain (Stravrakakis, 2005).  
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To be sure, it is not only the conditionality of European integration which fails to 
create an identity formation friendly environment; the difference in political-
procedural terms also has to be taken into account. Using the Rokkan/Almond/Pye 
model of nation-building, it becomes apparent that the European integration 
process is based on essentially different structures and modes. It has been stressed 
by political scientists that the European Union possesses all the characteristics of a 
democratic political system (set of institutions, influence of interest groups, impact 
of political decisions on the distribution of economic resources, continuous 
feedback – Hix, 1999: 2), but that it has neither developed into a state-like organism 
nor remained at a confederate stage of organisation. 
 
The structure of the member states in 1951 allowed the ECSC to integrate on the 
basis of a functional rather than a federal principle. Consequently, issues of state-
building were only partially necessary to establish a bureaucratic structure, task 
coordination (penetration), and a set of legal rules (integration). Having left out the 
stages of identity and legitimacy-building, according to the modified 
Rokkan/Almond/Pye model, the European Communities focused on redistribution 
(institution building, social policies, support for poor regions), rather than 
penetration. Applying the stages of nation-building to the European integration 
process (as shown in Table 1) generates a different picture:  
 
In this model, the problem of penetration and incorporation of the masses results 
from the inability of the Union to govern national publics. Hence, the penetration 
phase is divided into three parts, depending on the transfer of political power from 
the member states to the supranational level. In the beginning phase, the functional 
community-building stage replaces the state-building process, followed by system 
consolidation in selected fields (regional policy). The failure of the European Union 
to autonomously control interpersonal redistribution policies in Europe divides the 
distribution phase in at least two parts: the first one would be the legal-political 
foundation of the EU on a constitutional treaty and the second the extension of the 
EU policy regime towards ‘high politics’. In short, the EU does not fulfill the 
functions of the modern welfare state, as Scharpf (1997) analysed; the formation of 
an EU welfare state, even hypothetically, can therefore only be expected to happen 
in a slow and incremental manner. 
 
In the model outlined in Table 2, early efforts to enhance legitimacy precede further 
stages of sovereignty transfer and eventually identity formation, based on the 
assumption that a supra-national government would hold powerful identity 
creation tools. Turning the causality of ‘identity creates legitimacy’ (as in the 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2008, No. 1 
12 
 
national experience) to ‘legitimacy creates identity’ (in the context of European 
integration) has major theoretical implications as it requires a modified concept of 
popular legitimation. The academic debate has produced many valuable writings 
on this theoretical question, which shall, therefore, not be pursued in this paper.6  
 
Table 2: Model of Community-building (based on Rokkan/Almond/Pye, 1979) 
Stage 
 
Crisis, 
Challenge, 
Problem 
Institutional solution, examples 
 Penetration I Establishment of a rational bureaucracy, coordinated 
tasks and decision-making procedures 
Community-building Integration Establishment of rules (EC law) 
 
 Distribution I Establishment of institutions to promote financial 
balancing between prosperous and poor regions 
   
 Participation Extension of franchise, protection of minority rights   
 
Consolidation of  
System 
Legitimacy Efforts to create loyalty and trust among the citizens 
in political institutions; efforts to secure obedience 
to the law; institutionalised rites and symbols 
(myths, flags, anthems etc.) 
- - - current stage - - -  Integration II Implementation of a Constitutional Treaty 
 
 Penetration II Development of infrastructure, defence, crisis 
management; mobilisation of resources (taxes, work 
force) 
   
Suprastate-building Penetration III Establishment of a supranational government 
 Integration III Implementation of a Constitution 
 
 Distribution II Establishment of institutions to promote social 
security and income adjustment through progressive 
taxation  
 Identity Establishment of media systems and institutions in 
order to socialise the citizens: schools, information 
and communication systems 
                                               
6 The link between supranational identity and supranational legitimacy were made by Hale 
(1993), Bellamy, Bufacchi and Castiglione (1995), Laffan (1996), Shore (1996; 2000), Moreira, 
(2000), and Dunkerley (2002); critical views came from Lord and Magnette (2001), and 
Dobson and Weale (2003). The link between the EU democratic deficit and a missing sense 
of identity has been made by Majone (1994), Delanty (1995) Scharpf (1999) and 
Chryssochoou (2003). The identity-legitimacy link was originally introduced by Weber 
(1968/1922), Lipset (1963) and Pye (1971b). Habermas thoroughly reviewed the issue (1973) 
and transferred it to post- and supranational levels of politics (1974, 1991, 1992, 1998a, 
1998b).  
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The ‘multiple identity problem’ of the European integration process suggests that 
important prerequisites for collective identity formation at the European 
supranational level are not fulfilled. The lack of substantial change in power 
relations or socio-economic conditions and the absence of an explicit popular desire 
to belong to a new political entity are significant obstacles to the formation of a 
European identity. Additionally, as the stages of community-building do not 
correspond with the stages of nation-building, there is no reason to assume a 
similar effect with regards to identity construction. To elaborate on this claim, 
exploring the feasibility of EU identity politics, the analysis shifts from the polity to 
the policy level. 
 
The impossibility of EU identity politics  
Since the 1980s, influenced by the Tindemans Report (1976) and the Adonnino 
Committee Report of 1984 (European Council, 1984), the EU has endeavoured to 
enhance popular commitment to the integration process. At first sight, the chosen 
measures appear similar to national identity politics. So, the question arises: Does 
the EU pursue its own identity politics? Have the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and (more indirectly), the European Court of Justice – as the 
EU’s supranational actors – sought to foster a European identity, as Eriksen and 
Fossum (2000) suggest? Do we witness, in parallel with the Europeanisation of 
politics, a Europeanisation of people(s)? 
 
Indeed, we find indicators to support this view. In the first instance, EU symbolism 
(flag, anthem, passport, money, institutions, celebrations, number plates etc.) 
openly competes with the symbolisms of the member states. Although often 
concealed, European collective identity is declared in many official documents as a 
priority aim of EU policies, in particular with regard to education, youth, media 
policy, and, lately, European monetary policy. Even attempts to create historical 
myths about a common European heritage can be found: Christianity, 
enlightenment and modern statehood are used to declare a homogeneous ground 
for ‘Europeanism‘ (Höjelid, 2001). Although some of these ‘consciousness-raising’ 
campaigns (Shore and Black, 1994: 286), such as establishing European sport teams 
and EU stamps, clearly failed, identity-formation can be conceived as an integral 
part of EU politics. But can these measures be identified as a coherent EU identity 
policy?  
 
Firstly, there is no evidence of common political will to factually homogenise the 
European peoples, to create a cultural and political supra-nationalism. Although 
some pro-integrationist and pro-federalist governments (as in Luxembourg and 
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Germany) generally support the idea of supranational identity formation, 
economic-functionalist oriented members such as the United Kingdom and 
Denmark strongly oppose it. Typically, a reference to ‘European identity’ was 
resentfully rejected by the British delegation during the Maastricht negotiations. 
The Maastricht Treaty carries a reference to ‘reinforce the European identity’ 
(Preamble) whilst at the same time emphasising the ‘Union’s respect for the 
national identities’ (Art. F [1] TEU). The increasing sensitivity of the issue is finally 
unmistakably expressed in the preamble of the draft treaty on a constitution for 
Europe, stressing the fact that the European people will remain ‘proud of their own 
national identities and history’, which displays an even stronger reference to the 
nation.  Secondly, despite the White Paper’s (2001) declaration on integration of the 
people, the EU treaties do not involve any political provisions or powers for (supra-
national) identity-forming redistribution. What is missing is a clear political 
mandate by the member states that refuse to cede political power in the sensitive 
areas of culture, media and education. To create a genuinely new frame for 
identification, the EU would need to have considerable control over at least the 
instruments of policy formation and implementation in these areas. 
 
Smith’s observation (1992: 72), that teaching is ‘determined by national, not 
European, priorities’ and that ‘the bulk of such [schoolroom] texts are national in 
content and intent’ is supported by later research. A survey by the DG Research of 
the European Parliament about the ‘European Dimension in Secondary Education 
in Europe’ found the implementation of a European dimension in education ‘often 
insufficient’ (European Parliament, 2003: 56), due to a general ‘lack of coordination, 
inadequate teacher training and certain barriers’ (ibid: iii). The ‘certain barriers’ was 
a clear reference to a political and administrative unwillingness in some member-
states, such as Britain. As long as the member states are the principal actors in the 
European integration process, and as long they control and constitute the European 
Union, they will retain the monopoly on identity politics.  
 
For the time being, the power centralisation on member state level makes 
supranational identity construction impossible. The Union, understood not as an 
antithesis to the state but as a functional and institutionalised extension of national 
interests (Milward, 2000), has to acknowledge the ‘limits of community-building’ 
(Lijphart, 1977; Gephart, 1993) and identity-building (MacClancy, 2000). In terms of 
public awareness and participation, the national state remains the intermediary 
governing body between the citizens and the EU. Interaction occurs predominantly 
between the publics and state governments, then between the EU and state 
governments. To date, the governing elites of the member states have largely 
resisted political spill-over processes from the European market towards polity 
building. 
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Evaluation: European integration and path-dependency 
Path-dependency as concept refers, as Pierson (2000: 252) explains, in a broader 
sense ‘to the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence’. Path-
dependency in EU studies is bound to the historical-institutionalist approach which 
states that EU institutions matter in policy-making, depending on various 
conditions and resources like leadership and information (Bulmer, 1994; Pierson, 
1996; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Beach, 2005). The understanding of path-
dependency in the current analysis refers to the modified Rokkanian model of 
community building (presented above), implying that the European Commission 
has launched actions for identity creation based on national state-building 
blueprints. 
 
From a supranational-federalist perspective, the lack of power to introduce effective 
EU identity politics must be perceived as an instrumental gap. The strongly 
advocated path of institutionalism and constitutionalism is aimed to secure the 
stability and longevity of a governmental system, by, following Lijphart (1979), 
‘ensuring social stability and enshrining an equitable balance of power, on the 
expense of explaining the logics and political consequences’ of the project. It is this 
very weakness of the federalist approach towards supranational integration that it 
strives for a European superstate without having the consent of either the member 
states, or the European peoples. The European Union represents a system that 
people find difficult to identify with and that struggles to create affective 
commitment. The EU is not comparable with other institutions or organisations and 
that is what irritates many citizens in Europe. The European integration process has 
a short past and only begins to provide enough historical material for its own 
historiography and mythology. And as it does not offer any comprehensible 
concept about its finality, it does not provide any concrete visions for orientation. 
Public reservation naturally results from the complexity of the political system and 
its unusually rapid political dynamic, which does not correspond to the stabilising 
and stable nature of political collective identities. Subsequently, for the majority of 
European citizens the EU symbolises functional integration, such as ‘freedom to 
travel, study and work anywhere in the EU’ (52% support) and the common 
currency (37% support) more than a guarantor for idealistic or historical values: 
‘democracy’ (24% support) or ‘cultural diversity’ (29% support) (Eurobarometer 63, 
spring 2005: 106). 
 
In the past, in order to demonstrate its uniqueness as a political system, the 
European Union avoided imitating or pretending state-building. But as it appears, 
the opposite is taking place in recent time. Until the 1990s, the Community had 
developed its own and individual set of expressions, such as ‘comitology’, 
‘subsidiarity’ and the ‘High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
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Policy’. These were deliberately chosen to avoid similarities to national political 
terminology. With the launch of the European Convention in 1999, however, 
officials in the European Commission, in line with pro-integrationist politicians, 
started to promote expressions that unavoidably competed with national 
symbolism. With the introduction of an ‘EU president’ and an ‘EU foreign minister’ 
into the ‘EU constitution’ the European Union unnecessarily risked being mistaken 
for a path-dependent state-building process. The failure of the ‘European 
Constitution’ in 2005 is also the result of public rejection of the EU’s superstate 
terminology. Changing the name of the legal document into ‘Reform Treaty’ 
(singed 13 December 2007) and dropping references to EU symbolism clearly takes 
account of these sensibilities.  
 
Anyway, EU symbolism, as Dunkerly (2002) argues, has never achieved a 
sustaining effect and probably will not. This is mainly due to the domination of the 
member states which establish, and continuously re-establish, their framework of 
legitimacy, democracy and nationality through their own identity politics. These 
observations have implications for the European integration process in general. 
Regarding European identity as the ‘missing link’ between EU politics and full 
political (input and output) legitimacy purports applying a state-oriented model of 
integration. Collective identity construction is per se a closed and backward oriented 
concept with its strongest roots in the nation-building processes of the 19th century, 
where popular legitimacy and identity-formation were irreversibly linked. But the 
application of a state-oriented perspective largely disregards the historical 
conditionality of collective identity creation and the social complexity of such 
processes, as Wendt was able to demonstrate (1999). For the European integration 
process, such a uni-directional trajectory implies the loss of alternatives which are 
necessary in cases of international crisis, political deadlock, or system failure. Those 
alternatives allowed, for example, for the ‘freezing’ of political integration in the 
1970s, the re-launch with the Single European Act and doubling the number of 
member states after the Cold War. One of the successful elements of the integration 
design was and has been sufficient systemic flexibility, which allowed for a constant 
assessment of successive deepening and widening. In its functional approach, the 
European Community has had to create new methods of governance in the shape of 
functional regimes and flexible sub-systems. 
 
From a strictly theoretical viewpoint, collective European identity construction 
must lead into a ‘state-formation trap’, which, at critical points, cannot allow for 
political measures that secure the integration project. These could imply the 
requirement of different speeds of integration, sub-group formation, or even the 
necessity to exclude members from the project. Additionally, as we have already 
seen, European identity issues seriously disrupt further integration as illustrated by 
the example of Turkey’s application for membership (Neumann, 1999). If the EU 
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member states want to prevent an unwanted debate about their ‘non-European’ 
minorities, they have to carefully assess the conditions and measures of future 
identity politics with its salient implications for issues of inclusion and exclusion 
(Delanty, 1995). Consequently, having once defined the parameters of ‘European 
identity’, be it culturally, historically or religious, the EU finds itself in an ‘identity 
trap‘, in which the flexibility of the deepening-and-widening method is irreversibly 
constrained. Consequently, a European collective identity (regardless of its 
feasibility and political desirability) should only be considered a possible result of a 
successful integration, not a prerequisite. 
 
Conclusion 
Dividing both – national and European – integration processes into their 
evolutionary sequences, as Rokkan proposed, reveals their different trajectories in 
terms of community building: Whereas the nation-state promoted collectiveness for 
its very existence (e.g. to achieve authority, solidarity, legitimacy and defence) the 
European Union builds up on exactly these manifested structures without neither 
aspirations nor powers to replace the current system. European integration has to 
be regarded as a prima facie interstate coordination process, opposed to state-
building, which is largely an intrastate process.  
 
The general impression, that European identity construction forms a necessary part 
of the integration process in the near future obviously stems directly from the 
historical experience of nation-state building. But the EU represents the first 
regional integration process in political history, in which the role of identity 
formation remains unclear and its possible impact highly ambiguous. At least two 
essential prerequisites for political identity formation are not fulfilled in the EU: 
first, an identity vacuum that would increase popular preparedness to accept new 
identity patterns; and, secondly, a political authority which controls the political 
instruments of identity formation. 
 
Even as a political vision, the concept of European identity has its limits – not only 
geographically, normatively, or socially. In the first instance, there are practical 
political reasons, as to why a model of supranational identity-building must fail: a 
lack of political will of national elites and the dominance of national demoi. The 
comparison with nation-state building processes has revealed that it would be 
wrong to label the European integration process as ‘supranational’. As it still 
engages at building a geographical space, an institutional setting and a legal basis it 
has not reached yet a level of creating a European collectivity. The European Union, 
as it presents itself since 1993, fulfils the criterion of a supra-state and supra-
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governmental structure with a complex dynamic nature that does not, due to its 
process character, allow the definition of a precise end-stage (a European people) 
which would be an essential part of political identity construction. Accordingly, the 
solution to the European identity question is neither imminent nor immanent. For 
the European Union is only at the beginning of becoming a political union; 
collective European identity formation is then a matter of Europe’s future rather 
than its past. 
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